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Abstract 
This article analyses small firm responses to a major economic downturn, based on 
empirical investigation in the UK and New Zealand. Despite differences in the timing 
and depth of the downturn, there is remarkable similarity in the sectoral composition 
of small enterprises and methods of financing in reported recession-related effects 
and business performance during 2008–2009. While recognising that the study 
focused on surviving businesses, in neither country did the downturn have a 
consistently negative impact on small businesses and in both countries a significant 
minority of firms surveyed performed well. The study provides much needed 
evidence on small businesse responses to major economic crisis. Conceptually it 
demonstrates that although many small firms are vulnerable to changes in 
circumstances over which they have no control, they show underlying resilience and 
a high level of adaptability and flexibility. Longitudinal follow-up is necessary to show 
how the types of adaptive behaviour observed impact on business performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This article investigates small firm responses to a major economic downturn and 
the factors influencing them. Although the recent financial crisis was global in 
extent, we can expect differences in its effects across economies depending on 
their relative exposure to the crisis, as well as differences in firm responses. The 
article focuses on two contrasting mature market economies: the United Kingdom 
(UK) and New Zealand (NZ). Although it may be argued that both economies 
have similar regulatory regimes and institutions, differences in the nature of 
markets may lead us to expect differences in the effects of crisis and in the related 
responses of small businesses. 
Markets impart pressure on firms to adapt to changing circumstances or to risk 
decline and exit, although businesses vary in their interpretation of and responses 
to, market signals. At the same time, identification of particular threats and 
opportunities tell us nothing about how firms choose to adapt or what might be the 
consequences of adaptation. Businesses always have some discretion regarding 
the strategies that they adopt, although often the degree of choice is severely 
constrained by resources or circumstances (e.g. Whittington, 1989). Larger 
enterprises, for example, might possess greater discretion than small firms 
concerning strategy choice owing to their superior resource base and higher 
potential resilience to cope with environmental shocks. Business strategy and 
performance vary with resources and capabilities, owner/manager perceptions of 
the threats and opportunities faced (Thomas et al., 1993) and the wider 
organisational, market, institutional and cultural context (Clark and Mueller, 1996). 
Firms take strategic decisions about which goods and services to provide (and 
thus, which markets to enter or exit), how to produce them, set prices and attract 
particular kinds of customers. Although this applies in buoyant times as well as 
during recessions, an economic downturn is likely to make some form of response 
essential. 
Recessions generate contradictory tendencies, with some constraining business 
owners in achieving their objectives, while others are enabling. They are also 
characterised by falling aggregate business sales and in addition, there is 
downward pressure on asset prices as markets for resources become less tight. 
This can be enabling for resource acquisition, as businesses have opportunities to 
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acquire resources at more favourable rates. To the extent that recession 
increases market exit, this is also enabling for surviving firms in reducing 
competition. Therefore, recession presents small businesses with a major 
dilemma: to cut costs in order to maintain survival in the short term but at the risk 
of reducing their capacity to adapt adequately when recovery comes; or to 
maintain greater capacity, incurring higher costs in the short term in order to retain 
the capability to realise opportunities for long-term value creation when the 
upswing comes (Silberston, 1983). Both processes – constraining and enabling – 
may occur simultaneously but unevenly during recession periods. In this context, 
the article is concerned with the types of management actions taken by small 
firms in response to what is widely recognised as the most serious economic 
crisis in the world economy since the 1930s. 
The rest of the article is divided into five sections. The next section provides a 
rationale for comparing the UK and NZ based on institutional theory. The following 
section provides an overview of the context for small businesses in the two 
countries. The article then reviews the key literature in relation to firm 
performance under recession conditions, presenting a conceptual framework and 
research questions. The data sources, sampling and survey methods used are 
described, followed by presentation of empirical findings with respect to business 
performance in 2008–2009, types of recession-related effects and firms’ 
responses to them and the results of multivariate analysis, followed by 
conclusions and policy implications. 
 
2. RATIONALE FOR COMPARING UK AND NZ BASED ON INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY 
An institutional approach to economic development (North, 1991) builds on 
conventional or neo-classical economic theory by incorporating a theory of 
institutions. It builds upon classic transaction costs theory (Coase, 1937), 
recognising that we make judgements based on imperfect information. Decision-
making is influenced by local environments, in which the role of institutions is 
influential. In a real world of uncertainty, individual decision-makers have bounded 
rationality (Simon, 1997) and institutions are able to reduce uncertainty which 
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determines the costs of transactions. Under institutional theory this determines the 
relative efficiency of markets: 
And because a large part of national income is devoted to transacting, institutions 
and specifically property rights are crucial determinants of the efficiency of 
markets. (North, nd: 2) 
In institutional theory, a distinction is made between formal and informal 
institutions, which in the case of the latter include social norms and codes of 
behaviour that emerge over time as a result of repeated interaction. In contrast, 
formal institutions are created to provide rules, regulations and property rights that 
enable decision-makers to engage in transactions with greater certainty. In mature 
market economies, formal and informal institutions tend to be mutually reinforcing, 
although often this is not the case in many transition and developing economies. 
In the present study, the decision-makers are owner-managers of small 
businesses in their respective local environments in the UK and NZ. Institutions 
cannot be equated with organisations as they provide the institutional framework, 
rules, regulations, constraints and norms of behaviour of the environment in which 
transactions take place. 
This provides the rationale for comparing decision-making of small businesses 
and their responses to the post-global financial crisis. It may be argued that the 
UK and NZ have a similar institutional framework. Most importantly, the NZ legal 
system of property rights and the rule of law, which is the basis for all 
transactions, have been modelled on that of the UK so for instance, the right of 
redress for any breach of contract is modelled on the UK’s legal and court system. 
In fact, both countries share the highest court of appeal for individuals undertaking 
civil action: the House of Lords. Hence, although the two economies are very 
different in size, the regulatory environment for decision-making is remarkably 
similar. For example, the annual World Bank Doing Business reports rank both 
countries in the top 10 nations in the world for the ease of doing business (World 
Bank, 2011). 
Institutional theory implies that organisations such as small firms operate within a 
social and legal framework of socially shared norms and values. Scott (1995) has 
developed this concept further, viewing institutions as ‘social structures that have 
attained a high degree of resilience’ (1995: 33). The implication is that where two 
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economies have similarly derived social and legal systems, it may be argued that 
these will influence small business behaviour and strategic decision-making 
similarly (Hessels and Terjessen, 2010). By contrast, if the two economies have 
evolved different social and institutional structures, the expectation will be that 
differences in human behaviour will result. The organisational infrastructure is also 
similar in both economies. Although there have not been the same dramatic fiscal 
interventions in the economy through the part-nationalisation of domestic banks 
as in the UK, in NZ the nature of the banking system and financial infrastructure 
are modelled on the so-called Anglo-American system: a transaction cost-based 
system rather than the more relationship-based and participative systems of 
Franco–German financial institutions (Berger and Udell, 2004). However, as 
pointed out by Berger and Udell, a relationship banking system is now more 
characteristic of the UK and North America, as their financial systems have 
moved in this direction (Berger and Udell, 2004). 
 
3. CONTRASTING NATIONAL CONTEXTS 
In this section, the UK and NZ economies are compared in terms of 
characteristics which have implications for the impact of the recession on small 
firms and their ability to respond. Despite similar institutional frameworks, 
differences may be identified in the size and structure of the two economies, the 
timing and depth of the recession and small firm financing and policy support 
measures. 
Size and Structure of the Economies 
Although the UK and NZ have similar gross domestic product (GDP) per head, 
situated 21st and 24th respectively in the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2010) 
listings, there is a significant difference in the size of the two economies, reflected 
in their respective populations: 60.9 million in the UK in 2010, compared with 4.3 
million in NZ (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2010). In both countries, the business stock is heavily skewed towards smaller 
enterprises. In the UK, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), defined as 
those employing fewer than 250 people, constitute 99 percent of the business 
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stock; three-quarters of enterprises are owner-only firms, employing no others 
(Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011). Similarly, 99 percent of 
NZ businesses are SMEs (Ministry of Economic Development, 2010), but in NZ 
SMEs are defined as employing fewer than 100 people. The small firms sector is 
dominated by micro-enterprises (defined as fewer than six employees), of which 
the majority are self-employed with no employees. Nine in 10 (90 percent) are 
classified as micro-enterprises and 69 percent have no employees. According to 
the World Bank Doing Business (2010) report, NZ was the best place in the world 
to start a business in 2010 and third for ease of doing business overall; the UK 
was ranked 17th and 4th respectively. 
There are significant differences in the structure of the UK and NZ economies 
(OECD, 2007). Although both are mature market economies, NZ has maintained 
a strong primary sector (9.2 percent of GDP compared to an OECD average of 2 
percent in 2001–2002). This influences the composition of the manufacturing 
sector, which contains an important food manufacturing element. Although the 
annual Statistics New Zealand Business Operations Survey excludes businesses 
employing fewer than six employees (Statistics New Zealand, 2009), it indicates 
that 9 percent of businesses were in agriculture, forestry and fishing or mining in 
2008, with 15 percent in manufacturing. In the UK, manufacturing accounts for 
just 7 percent, and agriculture for 4 percent of the business stock, although 
inclusion of the smallest firms in the UK data helps to explain some of the 
difference in the contribution of manufacturing compared with NZ. 
Differences in economic structure shape the nature and extent of the economy’s 
external linkages, particularly exporting activity. Although fewer NZ businesses 
exported in 2008 than their UK counterparts (15 percent, compared with 20 
percent: Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2009; Statistics New 
Zealand, 2009), external trade, particularly the export of primary products, is of 
fundamental importance to the NZ economy. In 2009, for example, one-third of 
total exports by value were dairy and meat products. This is important because 
NZ’s commodity exports were not as badly hit by the global financial crisis as 
other sectors, partly due to the continued growth of demand in China, NZ’s main 
trading partner for dairy products. Indeed, the country’s trading partners have 
become increasingly focused on Pacific Rim countries, with 49 percent of exports 
by value in 2009 going to Australia, China Japan and the USA (OECD, 2009). In 
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the UK, by contrast, 48 percent of exports by value in 2009 were destined for 
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands and the USA (Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010a) – all countries where demand was 
adversely affected by the downturn. 
 
Effects of the Crisis 
During 2008/2009, the world economy experienced its severest recession and 
financial crisis since the 1930s (IMF, 2010). The crisis led to the collapse, 
government bail-out or partial nationalisation of major financial institutions in 
Europe and the USA, and to major programmes of fiscal and monetary reform 
(HM Treasury, 2009; IMF, 2009). Even the most advanced economies 
experienced falling output, although the crisis was particularly keenly felt in the UK 
(Weale, 2009) because of the degree of dependence on the hard-hit financial 
services sector and the high level of household indebtedness (e.g. Cable, 2009). 
In addition, the UK was the last major economy to emerge from the recession, 
having experienced falling GDP for five consecutive quarters (Office for National 
Statistics, 2012): from the second quarter of 2008 through to the third quarter of 
2009, a cumulative decline of approximately 6 percent. Other macroeconomic 
indicators reflect the decline in business activity. Unemployment rose to 
approximately 8 percent for the period October to December 2009. The Bank of 
England interest rate has remained at a record low of 0.5 percent for three years. 
A string of surveys highlighted the general decline in sales, employment, 
investment and expectations in the UK during 2008 and 2009 (British Chambers 
of Commerce, 2009; Confederation of British Industry, 2009; SERTeam, 2009). 
Although NZ entered recession in the first quarter of 2008, this was a 
consequence of domestic rather than global factors. The recession in NZ resulted 
from domestic monetary tightening, decreasing housing market activity and 
temporary drought conditions, which affected agriculture and related activities 
(OECD, 2009). Businesses were affected by decreasing household demand, and 
unemployment rose from 3 percent to 6.5 percent by the third quarter of 2009. 
Although this is a large increase, it is modest by the standards of other OECD 
countries, including the UK. Positive growth of 0.2 percent in the second quarter 
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of 2009 marked the end of a five-quarter recession which had begun in the 
second quarter of 2008, during which time the NZ economy had contracted by 3.3 
percent. However, the depth of the recession in NZ compares favourably with 
other OECD countries, being placed seventh least affected out of 30 member 
states (The Treasury, 2010). Thus, although the recession in NZ started early, it 
has been one of the shallowest in mature market economies, which leads us to 
expect fewer and less dramatic responses on the part of NZ firms. 
 
Small Firm Financing and the Credit Crunch 
At first sight, the financial infrastructure and environment for small firm finance 
appear to be similar in the two countries. Both economies have an oligopolistic 
commercial banking structure, dominated by a small number of large banks, 
private sources of equity such as business angels and venture capital companies 
and similar publicly-funded investment schemes. Indeed, the early stage venture 
investment funds in NZ were modelled initially on their UK counterparts. Many NZ 
banks are subsidiaries of Australian banking groups which rival some of those in 
the UK, and indeed compete directly with UK banks through subsidiaries such as 
the Clydesdale Bank. It may be argued that NZ banks have been more sheltered 
from the impact of the credit crunch, as Australian banks did not have the same 
direct exposure to ‘toxic assets’ in North America as UK banks did. The main 
problem facing Australian banks has been the lack of liquidity in money markets 
since they are soundly capitalised, as indicated by their high credit ratings 
(Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2009). Four out of the top 11 banks in the world 
in terms of credit ratings are based in Australia, and Australian banks provided 
increased funding for their NZ subsidiaries during the recession (Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand, 2010). 
The initial impact of the credit crunch led the UK government to encourage and 
support greater concentration in the UK banking system, with two major groups 
forced into state-ownership.1 In addition, one major group (Barclays) turned to the 
Middle East for additional share capital, while another (HSBC) was largely 
unaffected. With the onset of the credit crunch in the UK in late 2008, and closer 
examination of bank lending and risk policies, an expected consequence would 
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have been a tightening credit market for small firms. However, contrary to much 
speculation, a survey of small firm finances suggested that in 2009, small firms 
that required debt finance were largely able to obtain it (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, 2010b). Indeed, there is evidence that bank lending 
increased until August 2009, as firms drew down on existing credit facilities, but 
this appears to have contracted subsequently as firms reduced demand for credit 
(Business Finance Taskforce 2010). 
At the same time, recession would have weakened small firm demand for risk 
finance as a result of retrenchment policies. The Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (2010b) survey provides some confirmation of retrenchment, 
with 22 percent of small businesses reporting steps to reduce dependence on 
external finance. For all small firms, 16 percent were offered debt finance in 2009, 
5 percent were turned down for this by all sources, and the remaining 79 percent 
did not apply. However, there was a significant increased use of credit cards, from 
28 percent of firms in 2007 to 58 percent in 2009 (Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills, 2010b). One factor influencing business responses to 
recession is the method of financing. In NZ, often personal assets are used as 
collateral to secure loans: typically residential property and land (Statistics New 
Zealand and Ministry of Economic Development, 2005). Unfortunately, it is difficult 
to compare small firm financing practices in the two countries during the recession 
because recent data are available only for the UK (Cosh et al., 2009; Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2010b), and NZ data is available only for 2004 
(Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Economic Development, 2005). Despite 
the dearth of recent NZ studies, there are differences in small business financing 
compared to the UK. These include a heavier dependence on short-term bank 
credit, especially bank overdrafts and lower use of formal equity sources 
(Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Economic Development, 2005). In 
addition, UK small firms used personal and business credit cards to a 
substantially higher degree: 55 percent of firms in 2004 according to Cosh et al. 
(2009), compared with just 6 percent of small enterprises in NZ in the same year 
(Statistics New Zealand and Ministry of Economic Development, 2005). This is a 
significant development in the UK, which is much less common in NZ, partly 
because Australian-owned banks in NZ have not made credit cards easily 
available. 
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In summary, although recession hit NZ earlier than the UK, it appears to have 
been shallower. In addition, the NZ banking system was less directly exposed to 
‘toxic assets’ than its UK counterpart, although it faced a similar lack of liquidity in 
international financial markets. Significantly perhaps, small NZ firms appear more 
dependent on short-term credit and overdrafts, although their use of credit cards 
is much lower than in UK firms. Differences in economic structure and associated 
export linkages mean that NZ small firms may have faced a less hostile business 
environment during the recession. 
 
Policy support measures  
In February 2009, the New Zealand government approved a small business relief 
package that consisted of an expansion to the export credit scheme, extended 
jurisdiction for the Disputes Tribunal, which offers a low-cost mechanism for 
settling disputes, expansion of business advice services and a prompt payment 
requirement for government agencies. However, the major element of the relief 
package was a suite of 11 tax changes. By reducing the amount of provisional 
tax, dropping the underpayment penalty rate, cutting back tax filing frequency, 
increasing the general sales tax (GST) registration threshold and simplifying the 
rules around tax deductibility, the government tried to assist smaller businesses in 
particular with their cash flow and to reduce tax compliance costs. In the UK, the 
government introduced a relief package for small firms in November 2008: some 
of the support offered was new, while some was a repackaging of existing 
support. The financial help involved a system of loan guarantees and financial 
advice for small firms accessed through Business Link. There was also a 
temporary cut in the value-added tax (VAT) rate, an acceleration of capital 
investment projects and accelerated roll-out of broadband, credit line as well as 
loan guarantees (in particular for SMEs), and measures to combat unemployment 
(e.g. paying companies to hire and train the unemployed). 
 
4. SMALL FIRMS AND RECESSION: A LITERATURE-BASED FRAMEWORK  
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Two broad sets of views regarding how small businesses are affected by 
recession may be identified, which we term the ‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’ 
views. In the vulnerability view, small businesses are treated as highly susceptible 
to external shocks, such as recessions, because of a number of size-related 
characteristics. These include more limited internal resources compared with 
larger firms, as well as a typically narrower base of customers and product lines 
across which to spread risk; and less bargaining power with a variety of external 
actors, including customers, suppliers and finance providers.  They are also much 
more likely to cease trading than larger enterprises (Storey, 1994).  
In this regard, whilst emphasising the adjustment capabilities of small 
manufacturing firms to external conditions, Smallbone, North and Kalantaridis 
(1999) pointed to time lag effects on a panel of manufacturing small firms with 
economic downturn in the early 1990s affecting first sales, then profitability and 
finally survivability as short-term responses proved insufficient to keep the 
business alive in the medium-term. The study also raised questions about the 
long-term consequences of adaptation strategies that involve cutting investment 
and substituting labour (sometimes personal and family) for capital.   
In the resilience view, it is the flexibility and adaptability of small businesses that is 
emphasised, based on adjusting resource inputs, processes, prices and products, 
enabling them to survive, and possibly thrive, during periods of economic 
downturn (e.g. Reid, 2007). Davidsson, Lindmark and Olofsson (1999) 
investigated the effect of the 1990-93 recession on the contribution of small firms 
to job creation in Sweden, concluding that their role did not vary significantly at 
different stages of the business cycle. 
A deteriorating macroeconomic environment does not necessarily lead to a 
decline neither in small business performance and exit nor, contrary to the 
pronouncements of some commentators; constrain every small business in the 
same way. Indeed, a US study has shown that recessions do not have an entirely 
negative impact on the formation and survival of new businesses (Stangler, 2009), 
since more than half of the companies on the 2009 Fortune 500 list began during 
recession or bear market periods. A Schumpeterian view of recessions would see 
them as periods of 'creative destruction' in which old technologies, products and 
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industries go into terminal decline while new ones emerge (Schumpeter, 1934; 
Anderson and Tushman, 1991).  
In analysing small firm resilience, studies demonstrate the importance of 
retrenchment activity (Churchill and Lewis, 1984; Michael and Robbins, 1998; 
DeDee and Vorhies, 1998), whilst others emphasise revenue-generation (Shama, 
1993; Latham, 2009) by small firms during downturns.  Recessions may stimulate 
activity in particular sectors, or types of business.  Where customers switch to 
cheaper products to restrict expenditure, for example, this may boost suppliers of 
such goods and weaken the position of higher-priced providers.  Some 
businesses might be willing to undertake risky investment, innovation or 
diversification because they perceive performance levels cannot be sustained with 
current practices.  As a result, business performance does not map on to 
business size in a direct way.   
Recessions impact unevenly on industries, regions and businesses and this helps 
to shape the diversity of experience of recession and business responses to it.  
Analysis should focus on the particular circumstances shaping individual firms’ 
activities, business responses, and the variable levels of performance achieved. 
Size and sector are two influences on firms’ adaptations and performance under 
recession conditions.  
While it might be argued that the dichotomy between small firms’ vulnerability 
versus resilience is simplistic, it is a useful one in the context of this research as it 
puts the focus on the adaptive capability of small firms. Given the volatility of 
markets post GFC it is important to explore the ability of small firms to respond to 
changes in its external environment in order to retain its competitive advantage.  
 
5. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The conceptual framework presented in Figure 1 depicts the relationship between 
the GFC, its effect on NZ and the UK, recession related experiences of firms and 
their performance. While this is only a simplified framework that does not fully 
account for the dynamic and complex relationships between the GFC and small 
firm performance, it is an attempt to explain small firm responses to a major 
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economic downturn in two countries that have a similar institutional framework but 
different macroeconomic characteristics. It is an attempt of a representation of 
how small firms interact with their external environment i.e. the impact of the 
external environment on firms and how this impact triggers strategic adaptations 
in small firms.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The overall aim of this research is to explore recession related effects on firms, 
their responses and its impact on firm performance in two contrasting market 
economies. More specifically this study aims to answer the following three 
research questions: 
1. How did the recession affect small firms in NZ and the UK? 
2. How did small firms in NZ and the UK respond to recessionary conditions? 
3. What are the factors that drive small business performance under recessionary 
conditions in NZ and the UK? 
 
6. METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Methodology 
Comparison of the effects of the downturn on small firms and firms’ responses is 
based on data drawn from parallel mail/online surveys in the two countries, which 
included common questions. In both cases, the aims were to identify the effects of 
the 2008/9 global recession and financial crisis on small firms, drawn from a 
variety of sectors; examine the management actions/strategies adopted by small 
business owners and the consequences so far; and analyse the short- and long-
term implications of such actions for business performance.     
In the UK, the study was undertaken in London. It involved a combined online/mail 
survey conducted during March-August 2009, which generated 343 usable 
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responses. All businesses were independent, employing fewer than 250 
employees.  The survey sample was drawn from lists of Workspace Group PLC1 
tenants. All independent, privately owned firms were surveyed (approximately 
3000), which means that the response rate was approximately 11 per cent. The 
online/mail survey generated quantitative data on the perceived impacts of 
recession, business responses, changing patterns in the use of finance and 
finance-seeking behaviour, and actual and anticipated business performance.   
In NZ, the survey was part of an annual national mail survey undertaken by the 
NZ Centre for SME Research known as the Business Measure, which is designed 
as a longitudinal study and uses a revolving panel2. Replacement was achieved 
from a representative sampling frame purchased from APN Infomedia, a 
commercial provider of business-to-business information.  The 2009 survey 
involved 4,165 firms. There were 1,438 usable responses after excluding 297 
ineligible and unreachable firms. The overall response rate was 37 per cent. The 
survey was carried out between October-December 2009.  
Although there was a difference of approximately 6 months in the execution of the 
two surveys, the key questions used to make comparisons referred to the same 
time periods. In the case of the NZ sample recall bias is not considered a major 
issue due to the short recall timeframe of only six months. Delmar and Wicklund 
(2008) reported in a study of small firm growth that respondents were able to 
correctly recall sales and employment data of their firms 3 years ago. 
 
Variables 
Business Performance: Vulnerability vs resilience 
Vulnerability/resilience was measured using a combination of three variables. The 
first variable was impact of the recession and measured whether respondents 
were affected by the recession (coded 1) or not (coded 0). Further, respondents 
were asked to compare the value of sales and profit margins in Q1, 2009 with the 
                                                     
1 Workspace PLC is an industrial and commercial property provider operating mainly in London and 
the South East.  
2 A revolving panel is used to compensate for attrition of firms over time, feeding in replacement firms 
for those dropping out each year, in order to keep the size of the panel stable. 
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same quarter 12 months previously using a 5 point Likert scale ranging from 
1=significantly higher to 5=significantly worse. The reluctance of business owners 
to report financial data in a postal survey led to the measurement of perceived 
performance as advised by Garg, Walters and Priem (2003). Responses from 
both variables were combined into a new growth variable. Significantly higher and 
higher sales was combined with significantly higher and higher profit margins and 
coded as 1=growth. Same, worse or significantly worse sales and profit margins 
was coded as 0=non-growth. From the resulting two variables – impact of the 
recession and growth – a matrix was constructed that guided the classification of 
cases into the two categories vulnerability and resilience (see Figure 2). Only 
those respondents that reported not being affected by the recession and had no 
growth were excluded from the classification.  
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Experience of recession related effects 
Respondents were asked to what extent their business has experienced 
recession related effects. Eleven different items were used to measure finance as 
well as non-finance related effects using a 5 point Likert scale ranging from 
1=strong positive effect to 5=strong negative effect. Finance related effects 
included: Late payment by customers, bad debts or uncertainty over customer 
payments, level of cash at bank, credit periods and/or credit terms from suppliers 
and availability of bank loans/overdrafts. Non-finance related effects included: 
transport costs, costs of supplies, changing value of NZ$/GBP, energy costs, level 
of staff motivation, ability to recruit staff. 
Adaptive strategies 
Respondents were asked about actions they had taken since the start of 2008 
that were designed to improve or maintain business performance. A checklist of 
34 actions, under eight broad categories, were presented: changes in sales and 
marketing, markets, employment, products and services, finance, owner manager 
behaviour, production and business processes and business organisation (Table 
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5). Responses followed a dichotomous format using 1=action taken and 0=no 
action taken.  
 
Limitations 
While the two surveys vary in terms of scale and methodology, we believe that the 
comparative analysis still has the potential for an important contribution. 
International comparative studies are quite rare because of methodological 
challenges and limitations. However, national contexts are critically important for 
the understanding of small firm strategies and performance. In the current study 
methodological limitations are mitigated by analysing the two datasets separately 
and by carefully interpreting the results. 
In comparing the effects of and adaptation strategies to the recession in the two 
countries, it is important to keep in mind that the survey results refer only to 
surviving businesses. Aggregate data show the effect of the crisis on business 
deaths. In the UK, 279,000 businesses closed in 2009, the highest number since 
the current series began in 2000 (ONS 2010). This represents an enterprise 
‘death rate’ of 11.9 per cent (as a proportion of active enterprises 3 on the Inter-
Departmental Business Register (IDBR) compared with the 2008 figure of 
221,000 business deaths. 2009 was the first year that business deaths had 
outnumbered business births since the series began, 236,000, a rate of 10.1 per 
cent. This compares with 267,000 births in 2008, a rate of 11.5 per cent. In 2009 
there was an 11.7 per cent decrease in the number of business births. Clearly, 
recession in the UK contributed to a decline in new business births and an 
increase in the number that went out of business.  
The NZ business demography data (MED, 2010) shows a similar trend but with 
greater fluctuation given the relative size of economies. In 2009 the number of 
businesses that ceased to trade was not only the highest since the series began 
in 2001, but it was also the first time that business deaths had outnumbered 
business births (52,879 deaths compared to 51,796 births). In 2009 business 
births were down 15 per cent on 2008. Further, statistics from the NZ Insolvency 
                                                     
3 An active enterprise is one that has reported employment or sales turnover during the period. 
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and Trustee Services (2010) shows a 100 per cent increase in the number of 
company liquidations from 189 companies in 2008 to 377 in 2009. 
 
Sample Characteristics and Profile Data 
The two samples which provide the survey data in the two countries are 
compared by firm size, sector and performance in Table 1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In both samples the majority of firms i.e. 95.8 percent in the UK and 89.9 percent 
in NZ are micro in size employing less than 10 staff. The NZ sample contains 
slightly more small firms with 9.6 percent compared with 3.6 percent in the UK. 
Only a minority of firms in both samples are medium sized firms. The sector 
composition of the two samples is considerably different. While the NZ sample 
has got a stronger emphasis on manufacturing, wholesale/retail and other 
services, the UK sample represents more businesses operating in business, 
finance and professional services as well information and communication 
services.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Turning to the performance of surviving, surveyed businesses, despite differences 
in the depth and timing of the recession, and in the economic structure of the two 
economies, the survey results show a remarkably similar spread in business 
performance during 2008-9 (Table 2). In both surveys, In terms of sales, 
approximately a quarter of NZ small firms reported increases compared with 28 
per cent of UK firms; 50 per cent experienced falling sales, compared with 51 per 
cent of their UK counterparts. In terms of profit margins, 19 per cent of small firms 
in NZ reported increases compared with 22 per cent of UK small firms; 50 per 
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cent of firms in both countries experienced declining margins. Whilst half of small 
enterprises in both countries experienced deteriorating performance in 2008-9, a 
significant minority of firms were able to ride, or avoid the economic storm and 
grow. The similarity in the performance of the two national cohorts is striking. As a 
result the proportion of businesses that were classified as resilient or vulnerable 
was similar too. For both samples, 80 percent of respondents were classified as 
vulnerable. 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
7. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS PERFORMANCE, RECESSION 
RELATED EFFECTS AND FIRMS’ RESPONSES TO THEM 
In this section, we compare the effects of the recession on small businesses and 
their responses in the UK and NZ. In order to facilitate comparison, the survey 
data are weighted according to the respective size distributions of small 
enterprises in the two countries, so that the results are representative of the 
national populations of small firms.   
 
Experience of Recession-Related Effects  
Respondents were also asked about the extent to which their business had 
experienced various finance and non-finance related effects since the start of 
2008 (Table 4). The results highlighted some interesting differences and 
similarities in how the recession has impacted on NZ and UK small businesses. 
The shallower recession in NZ is reflected in the survey results which show that 
small NZ businesses were less likely to report negative finance-related effects 
than their UK counterparts, although the rank order was similar. Late payment 
appears to be a particular problem for UK small firms. With 63.4 percent it was the 
most commonly reported negative effect in the UK. The only finance related effect 
that was more pronounced for NZ small firms was negative cash at the bank 
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effects as firms deposited less than they were drawing out. This might reflect the 
greater emphasis on overdrafts and short-term credit by NZ small firms.  Only one 
in five respondents in each country reported a tightening of bank overdrafts and 
loans, presumably because of a high reliance on self-financing. In both countries, 
approximately three quarters of respondents reported being unaffected by the 
effects of the recession on the availability of bank overdrafts or loans. Similarly 
most firms in the two countries reported being unaffected by any change in credit 
periods or terms from suppliers.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Overall, small firms in NZ were more likely to have been affected by non-finance 
related effects such as rising energy, transport and supply costs. Those three 
effects might explain the negative cash at bank effect mentioned previously 
through increasing pressure on cash flow at time when demand is falling. In both 
countries, the range of responses is striking, emphasising the differentiated 
impact of recession on small firms.  
Although it is the negative effects on firms that are usually highlighted, recession 
conditions can also provide business opportunities for some firms. In both 
countries positive effects were most commonly reported in relation to ease of staff 
recruitment and staff motivation/effort, indicating the influence of loosening labour 
market conditions during a period of growing unemployment and fear of 
redundancy.   
To explore the relationship between recession related effects and business 
performance, Student’s t-test was used to assess whether the means of the two 
business performance groups (i.e. resilience and vulnerability) are statistically 
different from each other.  
For NZ, results showed that resilient firms  were significantly less likely (at the 5 
percent level or higher) to have experienced negative effects in relation to rising 
cost of supplies, late customer payments, bad debt or uncertainty over customer 
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payments, cash at bank and the changing value of the NZ dollar. Instead, they 
were significantly more likely to have experienced positive effects in relation to 
their ability to recruit staff and the level of staff motivation. In the NZ context it 
seems that resilient small firms were far less affected by finance related effects of 
the recession. Instead they benefited from the changes to the labour market.  
Similarly, resilient small firms in the UK were significantly more likely to report 
positive effects in relation to ease of recruitment and staff motivation indicating the 
influence of loosening labour market conditions. Further, they were significantly 
less likely to have experienced negative effects in relation of energy costs, credit 
periods from suppliers and level of cash at bank. 
  
Overall the recession impacted differently on small firms in NZ and the UK 
reflecting some of the differences in the two markets. Not surprisingly perhaps, 
negative recession-related effects were more likely to be reported by vulnerable 
firms. By contrast, positive effects were more commonly reported by more resilient 
firms.   
 
Recession-Related Responses 
Both similarities and differences between countries were evident in the actions 
taken in response to the crisis.  In both countries, the most common response 
was some type of change in sales and marketing practices designed to boost 
revenue. At the same time, there was considerable heterogeneity in the pattern of 
response, as NZ firms being more likely to have both increased and decreased 
promotional expenditure demonstrates. It has to be noted though that in NZ 
changes in employment practices was equally high ranked as changes in sales 
and marketing practices. In relation to employment practices, NZ firms appear to 
have placed greater emphasis on cost cutting and retrenchment compared to their 
UK counterparts. For small firms in the UK, however, the second most common 
response was to develop markets. Clearly, the development of new markets was 
a lower priority for NZ firms at a time of recession (ranked 4th), reflecting their 
lower propensity to emphasise product and market adjustments. The small size of 
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the NZ economy combined with its distance from main export markets explains 
the lower percentage of firms in NZ that tried to adjust or develop markets. 
Changes to financial practices, however, was of higher priority for NZ firms 
compared to their UK counterparts which might reflect the greater downward 
pressure on cash held at bank felt by NZ firms. Investing personal savings, 
reducing debt to external sources and increasing debt financing were 
management actions that were more frequently taken by NZ firms. This may be 
partly explained by differences in the pattern of financing, with small firms in NZ 
relying more on personal assets to finance their businesses including residential 
property. 
Looking at individual actions rather than broad strategies, introducing new or 
improved products/services and the owner/manager personally working longer 
hours were the most frequently adopted responses in both countries with half of 
the sample firms, or more, reporting such measures. In both countries changes in 
business organisation were the least common responses by small firms.  
While firms in both countries responded with a mixture of revenue-generating and 
cost-cutting measures, there were clear differences in the management 
responses reflecting differences in the opportunity structures faced, related to the 
size and diversity of the two economies. As a result NZ firms were more likely to 
have undertaken cost-cutting and retrenchment activities. This is reflected in the 
higher propensity of NZ firms to reduce employment, to introduce wage/ salary 
freeze, to increase use of unpaid family labour, to reduce the range of products 
and services offered, external debt and to have sold personal assets.  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Further, Chi2 - Tests were performed to explore the differences in adaptation 
strategies between vulnerable and resilient firms in both countries. Table 6 and 7 
compare statistically significant differences (at the 5 percent level of higher) in the 
adaptive strategies of firms that were classified as vulnerable and resilient in the 
UK and NZ. In both countries the principal mode of adaptation of vulnerable firms 
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was to cut costs. This was achieved though a wide variety of practices related to 
marketing, employment, finance, product/service and owner-manager behaviour. 
Most of the cost-cutting practices, however, were short-term adjustments rather 
than strategic restructuring approaches. While there was great similarity between 
the two countries, NZ firms seem to have placed greater emphasis on cost-cutting 
indicated by the wider range of actions taken. Overall this reflects the 
aforementioned tendency of NZ firms for ‘battening down the hatches’ to survive. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Similarly, Table 7 compares the adaptive strategies of firms that were classified as 
resilient. In both countries the principal mode of adaptation for resilient small firms 
was to generate revenue through three distinct strategies: Selling more to existing 
customers, investing in new equipment and increasing numbers employed. As 
such the adaptive behaviour of firms in the UK and NZ was surprisingly similar.  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Overall, the connection between business performance and mode of adaptation 
was striking in both countries. Not only was the broad mode i.e. cost cutting or 
revenue generating the same, but even individual strategies were similar. 
 
8. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF DRIVERS OF BUSINESS PERFORMANCE IN 
RECESSIONARY CONDITIONS  
In this section, we present the results of the multivariate analysis to explore the 
drivers of business performance in recessionary conditions. Binary logistic 
regression is used to estimate the impact of recession-related effects and firm 
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responses on performance.  Business performance was used as dependent 
variable with resilience coded 1 and vulnerability coded 0. The independent 
variables that were included in the model consisted of items relating to the 
experience of recession-related effects and the adaptive strategies taken by the 
firms. For both countries, only those variables were included that had been 
identified in the bivariate analysis to significantly differentiate between the two 
performance outcomes. Further, two control variables were included, firm size and 
sector. Firm size was measured by number of employees in natural logarithm and 
sector comprises manufacturing=1, wholesale/retail=2, construction=3, business, 
finance and professional services=4, information and communication services=5 
and other services=6. 
Logistic regression uses maximum likelihood estimation which relies on large-
sample asymptotic normality which means that reliability of estimates declines 
when there are few cases for each observed combination of independent 
variables. To test for adequate sample size Hosmer & Lemeshow’s (1989) criteria 
was used that recommends a minimum of 10 cases per independent variable.  
To assess model fit, Hosmer and Lemeshow’s Chi-Square Test of Goodness of 
Fit was used together with the Model Chi-Square result of the Omnibus Tests of 
Model Coefficients. Classification accuracy was assessed using the hit rate - the 
number of correct classifications divided by sample size. The criterion used to 
determine classification accuracy was that the observed hit rate had to be 25 
percent higher than the proportional by chance hit rate. Overall, both models were 
considered to adequately fit the data. Results are presented in Table 8 and 9. 
Resilient small firms in NZ were less likely to have experienced negative effects 
from late payments by customers, bad debts or cash at bank. Particularly the 
levels of cash at bank was a strong predictor of resilience indicating the 
importance of strong cash reserves to finance activity without relying on overdraft 
facilities or bank loans. Reflecting the stronger financial position of these firms, 
resilient firms were more likely to have increased numbers employed, less likely to 
have reduced selling price, less likely to have reduced numbers employed and 
less likely to have introduced wage/salary freezes.  
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Results from the UK sample provides a similar picture. Resilient small firms in the 
UK were less likely to have experienced negative cash at bank effects. Again, 
cash levels was the strongest predictor in the model and the only finance-related 
variable that had a significant effect on the prediction of resilience. In addition, 
resilient firms in the UK were more likely to have experienced positive staff 
motivation effects emphasising the differentiated impact of the recession on small 
firms. To adapt to recessionary conditions, resilient firms in the UK were more 
likely to have sold more to existing customers, less likely to have reduced selling 
price and less likely to have reduced numbers employed.  
 
9. CONCLUSIONS  
The international economic and financial crisis in 2008–2009 presented major 
challenges to firms of all sizes, but particularly smaller firms. A combination of 
resource-related constraints, low bargaining power in relation to a variety of 
stakeholders and a tendency to rely on bank credit when external finance is used, 
suggests that small firms may be particularly vulnerable during periods of 
economic downturn and financial crisis, compared with larger enterprises that 
control more substantial resources. 
Some countries have been affected by the crisis more deeply than others 
because of differences in banking systems and practices that affect the degree of 
exposure to international financial markets, as well as differences in economic 
structure and the pattern of international linkages. In this context, this article 
provides evidence of the effects of the recent economic and financial crisis on 
small firms in two economies which have similar institutional frameworks, but 
differences in the national context at a detailed level which may affect responses 
to recession-related effects. Despite differences in the timing and depth of the 
downturn, the sectoral mix of small enterprises and methods of financing, there is 
a remarkable similarity in reported performance during 2008–2009 among 
surviving firms. In neither country did the downturn consistently have a negative 
impact on survivor performance, and in both countries a significant minority 
performed well. 
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In both countries, approximately three-quarters of firms reported being unaffected 
by any tightening of bank credit, reflecting a reliance on self-financing. Despite 
these similarities, the empirical evidence points to some distinct differences 
between the two countries when it comes to the impact of the recession. NZ firms 
were less likely to report negative financial effects than UK firms, with the 
exception of downward pressure on cash held at the bank. NZ firms appear to be 
even more reliant on self-financing than their UK counterparts, which showed a 
higher propensity to resort to bootstrapping methods. In addition, differences were 
identified with respect to non-finance-related effects. Essentially, UK firms showed 
a higher propensity to experience currency fluctuation, whereas in NZ the rising 
cost of energy, transport and supplies most concerned small business owners and 
managers. The varying effects that the recession had on small firms in the two 
countries reflects the underlying differences in the structure of the two economies. 
In both countries, most firms responded to the downturn with a combination of 
revenue-generating and cost-cutting measures. The smaller size of the domestic 
market in NZ and a dispersed population, combined with a lower propensity to 
export, may have limited firm options in terms of finding new geographic markets. 
However, overall there appear to be fewer differences between the two countries 
in terms of the types of revenue-generating actions used than in the case of cost-
cutting. Essentially, NZ small firms appear to have placed greater emphasis on 
cost-cutting and retrenchment than their UK counterparts. This may be partly 
explained by differences in the pattern of financing, with NZ firms relying more on 
personal assets to finance their businesses. Therefore, contrasting management 
responses reflect differences in the opportunity structures faced, related to the 
size and diversity of the two economies. 
The number of small firms that showed resilience in relation to their performance 
was surprisingly similar in the two countries, despite the differences in how the 
recession affected firms and their responses. The results from the multivariate 
analysis show that surviving and resilient firms in both countries were less likely to 
experience negative finance-related effects, which might be linked to a stronger 
financial position. Besides finance-related effects, surviving and resilient firms in 
the UK in particular capitalised on the opportunity provided by increased staff 
motivation in uncertain economic times. Further, the results showed that surviving 
and resilient small firms are less likely to adapt to recession conditions by cutting 
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costs through, for example, reducing selling price or numbers employed: instead, 
they adapt by attempting to generate revenue. While UK firms are more likely to 
have increased their sales effort, NZ firms are more likely to have increased staff 
numbers: so investing in human capital reflecting structural differences in the two 
economies. The small domestic market in New Zealand makes it more difficult to 
increase sales, particularly in the case of highly niche-focused firms. Due to very 
low unemployment rates prior to the global financial crisis, NZ firms in particular 
struggled to find staff. With staff reductions in large firms, the changing labour 
market conditions have opened up recruitment opportunities for small firms. 
However, no firm size (i.e. within the SME size range) or sector effects were found 
in either country, indicating that surviving and resilient firms can be found across 
different sectors and size groups. While the recession might impact unevenly on 
small and large firms and industries, it is the individual experiences of recession-
related effects, and consequently the adaptive capability of the firm, that influence 
business performance. This confirms the importance of flexibility and adaptability 
in small businesses, which is emphasised in the resilient view. This means that 
small firms per se are neither vulnerable nor resilient: some are vulnerable, while 
others are resilient. How small firms cope with the impact of the global recession 
depends to a considerable extent on the strategy pursued, although strategic 
options are influenced by the position of the firm at the onset of recession. 
However, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ adaptation strategy. Strategies that were 
successful in one year might not be successful in another, and strategies that 
were successful for one firm might not have been for another. Finally, some 
strategies might be effective only in combination with others. 
In comparing the effects of adaptation strategies to the recession in the two 
countries, it is important to keep in mind that the survey results refer only to 
surviving businesses. Aggregate data show the effect of the crisis on business 
exits. Although in both the UK and NZ the recession caused firm births to reduce 
and deaths to rise, this was more marked in NZ. In the UK, 279,000 businesses 
closed in 2009: the highest number since the current series began in 2000 (Office 
for National Statistics, 2010), with an enterprise ‘exit rate’ of 11.9 percent (as a 
proportion of active enterprises4 on the Inter-Departmental Business Register) 
compared with the 2008 figure of 221,000 business exits; 2009 was the first year 
that business exits had outnumbered business births since the series began, 
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236,000, a rate of 10.1 percent. This compares with 267,000 births in 2008: a rate 
of 11.5 percent. In 2009 there was an 11.7 percent decrease in the number of 
business births. Clearly, recession contributed to a decline in new business births 
and an increase in the number that ceased trading. 
The NZ business demography data (Ministry of Economic Development, 2010) 
shows a similar trend but with greater fluctuation, given the relative size of 
economies. In 2009 the number of businesses that ceased to trade was not only 
the highest since the series began in 2001, but also the first time that business 
exits outnumbered business births (52,879 exits compared to 51,796 births). In 
2009 business births were down 15 percent on 2008. Data from the New Zealand 
Insolvency and Trustee Service (2010) show a 100 percent increase in company 
liquidations, from 189 companies in 2008 to 377 in 2009. Clearly, a 
comprehensive analysis of the effects of the crisis on small businesses must take 
into account the effects on business births and deaths as well as survivor 
responses. 
One of the key policy measures taken by the New Zealand government to help 
small firms to cope with the impact of the recession was tax reform, which was 
aimed at reducing pressure on cash flow. The present study results suggest that 
measures focused on increasing financial stability are necessary short-term 
actions. Beyond this, a more comprehensive post-recession support package may 
be necessary, when rapid expansion following a period of cost-cutting and 
retrenchment can present new challenges, such as the risk of over-trading. 
Overall, the article illustrates the adaptive behaviour of small firms under 
recession conditions. The results are strengthened by the fact that they emerged 
from two contrasting economies on opposite sides of the world. However, it must 
noted that there are limitations associated with the cross-sectional nature of the 
empirical results presented, since a longitudinal dimension is required to show 
whether or not the strategies and management practices used to achieve 
adaptability in the short-term will provide a basis for medium- and longer-term 
survival and growth. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Classification matrix 
 Affected by recession 
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Growth Resilient Resilient 
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Table 1: Sample Profile Data by Size and Sector 
 UK No. UK % NZ No. NZ % 
Employment Size4     
Micro 329 95.8 1291 89.9 
Small 12 3.6 139 9.6 
Medium  2 0.6 8 0.6 
Totals 343 100 1438 100 
     
Sector     
Manufacturing 37 10.8 384 26.6 
Wholesale/Retail 50 14.6 300 20.8 
Construction 15 4.4 214 14.8 
Business, finance and professional services 142 41.4 143 9.9 
Information and communication services 52 15.2 56 3.9 
Other services 47 13.7 289 20.0 
Totals 343 100 1386 100 
Note: there are 52 NZ cases missing from this table. 
 
Table 2: Business Performance Changes Between Q1, 2008 and Q1, 2009 (% of firms) 
 Value of sales Profit margins 
 UK (%) NZ (%) UK (%) NZ (%) 
Significantly higher 11.4 8.1 7.4 5.9 
Slightly higher 16.4 15.0 14.3 12.6 
About the same 21.3 26.9 28.8 32.0 
Slightly lower 26.1 26.8 27.8 25.8 
Significantly lower 24.8 23.2 21.7 23.7 
N 335 1382 333 1325 
 
 
Table 3: Classification of businesses 
 UK No. UK % NZ No. NZ % 
Resilient 51 19.9 197 19.4 
Vulnerable 205 80.1 821 80.6 
N 256 100 1018 100 
                                                     
4 In the UK, the definitions of small firms by employee size are: Micro < 10 employees; Small 10-49 
employees and Medium 50+ employees. In New Zealand the equivalent are Micro <6 employees; 
Small 6-49 employees and Medium 50+ employees. However, for the purpose of comparison, the 
New Zealand data have been reclassified into the size bands used in the UK.  
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Table 4: Experience of recession related effects (% of firms) 
 UK (%)  NZ (%)  
 Positive 
effect 
Negative 
effect 
No 
change 
N Positive 
effect 
Negative 
effect 
No 
change 
N 
Finance-related effects         
Late payment by customers 3.3 63.4 33.3 334 4.0 53.6 42.5 1387 
Bad debts or uncertainty over customer payments 1.0 51.5 47.4 334 3.8 45.4 50.9 1380 
Level of cash at bank 6.5 47.7 45.9 334 9.0 52.3 38.7 1390 
Credit periods and/or credit terms from suppliers 2.7 31.3 65.9 334 3.3 27.0 69.7 1381 
Availability of bank loans/overdrafts 4.8 21.8 73.4 334 6.6 17.9 75.5 1347 
Other types of effects         
Transport costs 6.4 52.3 52.3 336 6.9 58.6 34.6 1381 
Costs of supplies 7.6 46.4 46.0 333 9.9 63.8 26.4 1396 
Changing value of NZ$/GBP 13.5 43.8 42.7 333 9.2 33.7 57.1 1372 
Energy costs 4.8 39.8 55.5 335 6.1 54.7 39.2 1387 
Level of staff motivation 16.2 23.7 60.1 328 15.0 22.3 62.7 1376 
Ability to recruit staff 26.3 8.7 65.0 333 15.4 10.0 74.5 1364 
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Table 5: Actions Taken to Increase or Maintain Business Performance Since Start-2008 
 
Actions Taken   NZ (%)           UK(%) 
(a) Changes in sales and marketing5 78.7 82.0 
Increased sales effort  40.4 52.9 
Reduced selling prices, or held price rises below inflation 25.1 27.2 
Increased advertising & promotional expenditure  31.0 24.8 
Reduced advertising & promotional expenditure 20.3 13.5 
   
(b) Changes in markets 60.8 76.8 
Selling to new types of customer  37.4 46.8 
Selling more to existing customers  29.6 39.8 
Selling in new geographic markets  11.5 26.9 
   
(c) Changes in employment: 78.2 68.8 
Reduced numbers employed  41.9 26.9 
Introduced wage/salary freeze 20.0 14.7 
Introduced new working practices  17.4 16.8 
Increased use of external labour (e.g. sub-contractors,  
freelancers, agency temps, casuals etc)  
14.5 20.5 
Increased numbers employed  10.9 15.6 
Taken greater care in recruitment of staff 15.2 12.5 
Increased employee training 18.9 10.4 
Increased use of unpaid family labour  14.6 6.4 
Reduced employee training  2.7 2.1 
   
(d) Changes in products and/or services offered: 63.0 63.3 
Introduced new or improved products or services  53.6 57.0 
Reduced the range of products/services offered  13.9 8.9 
Increased use of intellectual property (e.g. patents, registered design, 
registered trademarks, copyright)  
4.3 5.2 
   
(e) Changes in Finance 70.5 61.2 
Renegotiated the cost of supplies  20.1 25.7 
Invested personal savings  27.6 20.2 
Shortened payment periods from customers/creditors  10.9 16.9 
Reduced debt to external sources  22.7 14.1 
Extended payment periods to suppliers 13.0 12.8 
Reduced investment expenditure 12.4 12.8 
Increased debt financing  16.5 5.8 
   
(f) Changes in Owner/Manager Behaviour: 60.9 63.6 
Personally worked longer hours 49.8 57.8 
Cancelled personal holidays 29.0 24.5 
Sold personal assets to compensate for poor business performance  9.7 5.8 
Other changes in owner-manager behaviour  6.6 6.4 
   
(g) Changes in production/business processes: 49.8 52.6 
Used new suppliers 32.9 32.4 
Invested in new equipment 25.9 26.6 
   
(h) Changes in business organisation: 29.3 33.9 
Made changes in managerial roles/functions  22.9 29.1 
Made changes in the management team 11.9 10.1 
 1242 327 
 
                                                     
5 Respondents were asked to report actions from a prompt list, and could indicate all, some or none 
from the list. Italicised figures refer to those reporting any of the actions within each of the nine 
categories.  
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Table 6: Comparison of strategic responses of vulnerable firms in NZ and UK 
New Zealand UK 
Reduced advertising expenditure 
Reduced selling prices or held selling prices below inflation 
Reduced numbers employed 
Introduced wage/salary freezes 
Reduced their investment expenditure 
Cancelled personal holidays 
Reduced range of products/services offered  
Increased use of unpaid family labour  
Invested personal savings  
Extended payment periods to suppliers  
Sold personal assets  
Personally worked longer hours  
 
Table 7: Comparison of strategic responses of resilient firms in NZ and UK 
New Zealand UK 
Selling more to existing customers 
Invested in new equipment 
Increased numbers employed 
Greater care in the recruitment of staff  
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Table 8: Estimation model for New Zealand 
 New Zealand 
 Exp (B) SE Wald p-Value 
Reduced range of products offered .852 .344 .216 .642 
Selling more to existing customers 1.328 .218 1.686 .194 
Reduced advertising expenditure 1.021 .288 .005 .941 
Reduced selling price or held price below inflation .288 .309 16.237 .000 
Invested in new equipment 1.147 .232 .349 .555 
Reduced numbers employed .507 .260 6.799 .009 
Increased numbers employed 4.122 .279 25.707 .000 
Increased use of unpaid family labour .872 .360 .145 .703 
Introduced wage/salary freeze .539 .305 4.120 .042 
Greater care in recruitment of staff 1.249 .264 .707 .401 
Invested personal savings .784 .266 .835 .361 
Reduced investment expenditure .856 .342 .207 .649 
Extended payment periods to suppliers .835 .330 .299 .585 
Sold personal assets .847 .528 .098 .754 
Worked longer hours 1.285 .230 1.187 .276 
Cancelled holidays .778 .274 .836 .360 
Costs of supplies  .943 .132 .199 .655 
Late payment by customers 1.561 .188 5.628 .018 
Bad debts or uncertainty over customer payments .639 .197 5.162 .023 
Level of cash at bank .619 .136 12.347 .000 
Changing value of NZ$/GBP .853 .122 1.693 .193 
Ability to recruit staff  .788 .165 2.101 .147 
Level of staff motivation .911 .147 .401 .526 
Sector: Manufacturing .681 .330 1.359 .244 
Sector: Retail/Wholesale  1.151 .331 .180 .671 
Sector: Construction .802 .386 .326 .568 
Sector: Business, finance and professional services 1.072 .392 .031 .860 
Sector: Information and communication services .762 .596 .208 .648 
Firm size .835 .144 1.584 .208 
Constant  13.555 .855 9.287 .002 
-2log likelihood 616.084 
Goodness of fit1 4.593 
Model chi-square 189.432*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .331 
Overall hit rate (%) 84.0 
Chance hit rate (%) 63.9 
1Hosmall firms and Lemeshow Chi-square test  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 9: Estimation model for UK 
 UK 
 Exp (B) SE Wald p-Value 
Energy costs 1.063 .345 .031 .859 
Credit periods and/or credit terms from suppliers .595 .464 1.254 .263 
Level of cash at bank .317 .377 9.298 .002 
Ability to recruit staff  .969 .464 .005 .946 
Level of staff motivation .335 .406 7.270 .007 
Selling more to existing customers 3.315 .494 5.897 .015 
Reduced advertising expenditure .172 .950 3.421 .064 
Reduced selling price or held price below inflation .232 .722 4.096 .043 
Invested in new equipment 2.532 .523 3.160 .075 
Reduced numbers employed .099 .827 7.857 .005 
Increased numbers employed 2.057 .617 1.366 .243 
Introduced wage/salary freeze .417 .799 1.194 .274 
Cancelled holidays .713 .543 .387 .534 
Sector: Manufacturing .303 1.061 1.267 .260 
Sector: Retail/Wholesale  2.118 .765 .962 .327 
Sector: Construction 4.515 1.176 1.644 .200 
Sector: Business, finance and professional services .771 .717 .131 .717 
Sector: Information and communication services .863 .743 .039 .843 
Firm size 1.228 .298 .478 .489 
Constant  870.013 2.513 7.252 .007 
-2log likelihood 213.603 
Goodness of fit1 5.199 
Model chi-square 101.226*** 
Nagelkerke R2 .547 
Overall hit rate (%) 87.1 
Chance hit rate (%) 60.00 
1Hosmall firms and Lemeshow Chi-square test  
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
 
